The nature of science

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           The intellectual community’s views on scientific process and the general handling of issues of truth, which effect many social institutions including justice, generally suffer from incompleteness, focusing on particular aspects of scientific process but failing to take all the aspects of science and truth together to develop a complete and unified picture.  Not only is it necessary to understand the nature of truth and the processes of induction, deduction and hypothesis, but it is also necessary to understand there relation to observations, generalizations and explanations, and to understand the effects of probability of truth, to understand beliefs, leads, and open-mindedness.  When all these aspects are taken together they produce an image of scientific/intellectual process that is quite sophisticated, that fits well with the methods of successful scientists and with the acceptance or rejection, often falsely, of knowledge by society.

            Now, there are three categories into which any particular scientific activity will fall, observation, generalization and explanation.  Observation is the most fundamental stage of science, something can be labelled as a science if the observation stage is present, however generalization and explanation without observation will not make a science.  For example, if the law of universal gravitation had never been discovered we could still make observations and predictions about the gravitational force at any point around the earth.  The gravitational force could, theoretically, be measured at every point around the earth and all this data stored away in a huge database.  Later, if we choose to launch a rocket this database could be used to find the force on the rocket at every point in its travels and hence be able to determine its ultimate path.  This example shows that with an immense database and huge numbers of measurements the same tasks can be performed as the law of universal gravitation without any knowledge of gravity.  Therefore the idea that the purpose of such formulas is to allow us to make predictions is invalid, since a formula is not necessary to accomplish this.  What is apparent from this example, however, is that doing without formulas would be highly impractical, that it would require immense amounts of time and resources to measure, store and utilize such data.  However, a formula allows all this data to be condensed into a single line.  This is the purpose of generalization, to condense what would otherwise require huge amounts of storage into a small enough package to be of practical use.

            Observation and generalization make up the bulk of scientific activity, the experimental scientists making and cataloguing measurements (observations) while the theoretical scientists seek the patterns within these measurements and devise formulas, systems or rules to allow others to remember and utilize these patterns.  The third stage of science, explanation, is the philosophical side of science, the pursuit of an explanation for why things are the way they are, and ultimately, why things exist in the first place.  People often call formulas theories, however this is the error of confusing generalizing science with explanatory science.  Returning to the example of the law of universal gravitation, this is not a theory, it is a description of a pattern that Newton identified, a formula, however there is nothing within this description that tells us what gravity is or why it exists, only that it behaves in a particular, completely predictable manner.  On the other hand, Darwin’s theory of evolution is a theory, it tells us not only how this phenomena behaves, but also what evolution is and, to some extent, why evolution exists.  This is what makes explanation greater than generalization, explanation not only performs the job of generalization by allowing us to predict the behaviours of a phenomena, but it also gives information about the phenomena that is absent in generalization.  The problem with explanatory science is that it is much more difficult than generalization science so that there are few intellectuals sufficiently talented to perform this task and fewer yet willing to risk their reputations (and funding) on such risky ventures.

            Now, the process of converting observational science into general science and general science into explanatory science is what I coin inductive-hypothetical-deduction.  This is opposed to the concept of hypothetical-deduction that is generally supported by other philosophers.  The problem with hypothetical-deduction is that no one, in reality, actually uses it.  No scientist could, within reason, hope to develop a theory without reference to observation and be successful; what scientists actually do is they act by trying to find a pattern in the observations or formulas, however since the formula is a complete expression of the observations, and a theory is more than the sum of the formulas that it is based on, the observations will always be insufficient to find the formula on their own and the formulas will always be insufficient to develop a theory.  The hypothetical part of this process is the act of using imagination to fill in the blanks.  Therefore, the actual scientific process is the act of using induction as far as it will take us, and then filling in the gapes with hypothesis.  The deduction phase follows the previous steps to test whether the hypothesis works, whether it produces a correct formula or theory (whether the formula fits the observations or the theory fits the formulas), or whether a new hypothesis will have to be developed.

            Now, although all this explains elements of the structure and process of science, it does not tell us what science is.  The obvious definition for science is that science is simply a collection of true statements, a true statement being any statement that coincides with reality.  The problem with this definition is that something can be true without there being any evidence for it, it is possible to come up with a true statement by pure random chance without basing it on any evidence.  However, a collection of such randomly true statements would not make a science.  In order for a true statement to be a scientific statement we have to have some reason to believe it is true, and that means that it is not only necessary that the statement coincide with reality, we must also be aware of the connection of that statement with reality.  If an individual were to come up with a statement without any evidence then they would have no reason to believe that that statement coincides with reality, and as such their belief in the truth of that statement would be unjustified and the development of that statement unscientific.  This is what distinguishes a scientific statement from a pseudoscientific statement, a scientific statement has a reason to be believed, some evidence that the statement coincides with reality, a pseudoscientific statement lacks such evidence, the statement could be true but we would not be justified in believing this, if it were true it would be true purely by chance.  Now, there are two forms of evidence, observations and logic.  For a statement to be validated it must not only fit one piece of evidence, it must fit all the available evidence.  Since both observations and logic are evidence, it is necessary that any statement that is to be called scientific fit both the observations and the logic, if the statement fits only the observations or the logic but not both then the statement fails to fit the evidence and hence fails to be scientific.  This is a significant clarification since there are several theories accepted by the scientific community that fail to meet the requirements of logic, as well as numerous theories in the philosophical community that, although logical, fail to fit the observations.  Theories of this sort are pseudoscience, no matter how popular with, or appealing to, the intellectual community they may be.

            Now, although the ideal would be for science to be a collection of true statements there is a problem with this idea, we are not omniscient.  Because of the limitations of the mind, that we can never be aware of everything, it is always within the realm of possibility that there may be a piece of evidence beyond our experience that proves us wrong.  This means that although we may strive towards the truth, since it is physically impossible to know with absolute certainty that any statement is the truth, in practice, science cannot be a collection of truths.  Rather, all that can be known about any statement is the general probability of that statement being true.  As a result of this limitation, science must be defined as, a set of statements that are either true or false, with an assessment of the likelihood of each such statements truth.  Actual practice in science would appear to counter this definition, however, this is a consequence of the reality that many theories in science have such a huge amount of supporting evidence that the probability of their being true in immense.  This huge probability is frequently mistaken for proof, that the theory is absolutely true, however an immense probability of truth is still a probability.  This error is a significant problem within science, it causes scientists to believe that only one theory is suited to be treated as scientific, and hence to dismiss and opposing theories that have merit and to dismiss an possibility that the leading theory may be incorrect.  This error can result in serious theories not being given their proper place in the literature.  It can also result in new theories being dismissed despite new evidence and advances in research within the subject.  The biggest problem, however, of this error of scientists believing that they actually know the truth is that it can cause them to become confused when dealing with theories where the evidence is difficult or where multiple theories exist with merit.  This confusion typically results in either a subject being dismissed as unscientific, or, if the subject is well established, concluding that a theory is true while the probability of this truth is still low.  Another problem with this error is that it excludes scientific process from the justice system.  When a judge is given a case they are given two statements, that the suspect is innocent or that they are guilty.  One of these statements is true and the other is false, however we can never know absolutely which is the case.  The role of the judge is not to determine the absolute truth of this matter, an impossible task, but rather to use the evidence available to determine the likelihood of these statements being true or false.  This is a scientific process, however since the evidence in most cases is much less conclusive than the evidence in the hard sciences, judges are not seen as scientific, even though the process, on a fundamental level, is identical.

            This brings up the issue of belief.  Although a judge may act by determining the probability of guilt or innocence in a case, it is only when this probability reaches a significant enough degree, that the judge concludes that the suspect is guilty.  The judge does not know that the suspect is guilty, they believe that the suspect is guilty.  What a belief is, is a sufficient degree of certainty that a statement is true that we act as though it is true.  It is belief that makes science practical, that allows a scientist to act on a theory without actually knowing the truth of that theory.  The scientist accepts that once the likelihood of a theory being true is sufficiently great then it is more beneficial to act as though it is true than to act out of uncertainty.  However, by accepting that this is a belief, not an absolute truth, a scientist maintains their open-mindedness.  Open-mindedness is the awareness that it is humanly impossible to know anything for certain.  An open-minded individual does not dismiss a theory based on their having an opposing belief.  This does not mean that such an individual necessarily accepts, or even listens to, such theories; an open-minded individual can criticize another’s work for being non-scientific.  It is the act of pursuing a theory scientifically that makes an individual worthy of the intellectual community’s attention, not the particular theory they happen to be presenting.

            Another issue that appears particularly strongly in justice is the concept of a lead.  A lead is an observation that suggests the possibility of a particular statement without providing enough evidence for that statement to be believed.  In order to punish a suspect a judge has to believe the statement, that that suspect is guilty, to be true.  However, if the investigator is not aware that the individual may have committed the crime then they might not gather the necessary evidence for the judge to come to that belief.  In order to develop a case to the point where the judge may conclude there is a strong probability of the individual’s guilt, the investigator must first start by showing that there is at least a minute probability of such guilt.  Leads are vital to the scientific process since they are that which leads to new discoveries, and as such it is important to pursue leads and support research that pursues such leads.  Unfortunately this often does not happen.  Because, by the vary nature of a lead, it has a low probability of success, society typically puts its attention and support towards science with a higher probability of success, science which people generally believe in.  However, once research reaches the belief stage most of the work has generally already been completed, so that society ends up throwing labour and resources at a finished product.  A further problem with leads is the danger of believing one.  This is the danger in justice of treating a suspect as though they are guilty.  However, to call something a lead is to say that it does not yet have enough evidence to be believed.  Therefore it is unjustifiable to act on a lead, only to pursue one.

            Now, although for a statement to be scientific we have to be aware of its connection to reality, to the evidence, in practice people typically believe in scientific statements without ever making the observations or doing the experiments those statements are based on.  To redo the work of past scientists would be impractical, the large number of ideas a student has to absorb could not be learned in a reasonable amount of time, or with a reasonable expenditure of money, if the student had to carry out all that work.  Moreover, many experiments require great talent, skill, time and patience to carry out.  As a result, people rely on trust to make science practical.  It is this reliance on trust that is the reason most experiments are never repeated.  If we believe the experimenter told the truth about their results and that they had sufficient skill to do the experiment then repeating the experiment would be a waste of our time.  This is an issue since it is believed be many intellectuals that an experiment is scientific only if it is repeatable, but of course few experiments that are considered to be scientific are ever repeated.  Now, it is true that a true observation should be repeatable, that the more times an individual repeats an experiment the more certain they will become that the observation is correct.  However, true scientists never demand this repetition, they know that no amount of repetition can ever raise the probability of truth to a hundred percent, and moreover such certainty is of no value to them, the fact that the experiment worked once is enough to make the statement the experiment was based on a lead.  Once a statement becomes a lead it is worthy of serious investigation, and as such is worthy of the attention of serious researchers.  The only thing that matters is whether those serious researchers trust the experimenter’s truthfulness and ability enough to conclude that the researcher actually did see something.

 

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